Many multiproduct industries produce "systems", i.e. sets of components that cannot be used alone but might still be bought separately.
Examples of such industries are the computer industry where a system includes several hardware components and software, the home -video industry, where a VCR, video cassettes and a TV screen must be used together, and the amateur photography industry, where the typical product line includes cameras, films and film processing services .
In such industries, the firms ' compatibility decisions are of utmost importance since they determine the kinds of systems that can be assembled by the consumers. This raises two related questions about the firm's incentives to achieve compatibility. First, what are the firms' incentives to make their components compatible with the components produced by other firms? This issue of compatibility between manufacturers has been studied by several authors. Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) argue that compatibility creates positive consumption externalities, called "network externalities" that raise the profitability of the industry , while Klemperer's analysis of market with switching costs (1987 a,b) suggests that firms might prefer incompatibility in order to lock-in their customers. Finally, Matutes and Regibeau (1988) argue that, when every firm produces every component of a system, compatibility increases variety, raising industry demand and weakening the firm's price-cutting incentives. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose the market(s) that they will serve. They also decide whether to produce different software for each market ("diversification") or to sell software that 3 can be used with both types of computers ("standardization") .
In the first instance, the firm can price its product independently in each market, while in the latter it must charge the same price in the two is firm j's profit when j serves only one market and the other firm standardizes.
n.
is firm j's profit when j diversifies and the other firm only serves one market. This is equal to 11 +11.
is firm j's profit when j only serves one market and its rival diversifies. This is equal to 11 .
Similar notation applies to prices with, for example, P..
representing firm j's monopoly price in market i. The firms sell an homogenous product in each market that they share.
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
The demand in each market is a continuous function given by figure #3 .
In the absence of entry fees, an equilibrium where the incumbent standardizes while the entrant Using the same demands as in example 2 it can be shown that :
1. Over the range of parameters for which NS is the equilibrium outcome of the game, the entrant chooses to enter the smaller of the two markets, leaving the larger one entirely to the incumbent.
2. The range of parameters for which NS is an equilibrium shrinks as the market sizes become more uneven. This is hardly surprising as an increase in the relative size of the incumbent's monopoly market makes diversification more attractive to the entrant.
III. DISCUSSION
The standardization equilibrium discussed in the two preceeding sections is somewhat similar to a situation discussed by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1986) . They specify a two-period model where two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant, compete to sell their product to consumers who are initially unaware of the existence and price of either good. In the first period, the incumbent advertises, at a cost, to inform some consumers of the existence of its product and he sells his good to the informed consumers whose reservation price is below the sale price. These first period consumers are forever loyal to the incumbent, constituting his 'captive' market.
In the second period, when both firms can advertise and compete in prices, this 'captive' market can prove to be a mixed blessing for the incumbent because it makes him more reluctant to match the price of the potential entrant. such that Q2g(P,P2B) > 0, n'^CP^.^) > n'"(P) > n(P,P2g) and n'^CP^.^) > n"'(P) so that n"'(p"') = n"'(p, . ) + n'^CP, . ) > n"'(P) + n(p,p"") so that 1 im xiin zd the incumbent would set P rather than charge P < P, . . lim lA. These are sufficient conditions for the (S,N) Unfortunately, it would no longer be possible to put a lower bound on the payoffs in the mixed strategy equilibria since the lowest price set by the incumbent could no longer be characterized by 11, (P, . ) + "2°'^^lim^= nj^^CP"") since we could have n^™(P) > n^^^CP-j^^j^) with P < P-, .
(market 1 being the incumbent's monopoly market). This could happen if the monopoly price in the share market is higher than in the monopoly market.
APPENDIX M SN
We show that P > P > pd, even when demands are not linear.
The general framework follows Singh and Vives (1984 '^a'^IA^'^a"^"
*"^a '^2A*'^a"'^2B^" '^' i^Pli^s that:
A^lA^^A '^2B^"^"^^"^^^^"^^^A "^^2 A^°^^"^g iven P2g.
Summarizing, it has been shown that for all P"r, corresponding to an interior solution. A' s reaction function on market 2 in the case of standardization lies everywhere above A' s reaction function when A diversifies.
As B' s reaction function is the same in the two cases and is upward sloping, it follows that in the standardization equilibrium prices are higher than in the diversification equilibrium. Finally, one can check that firm B' s profit on market 2 increases along B' s reaction function (see Cheng) , so that tt^> n .
If ?,. < PoA.^1 1 the results are reversed so that 7r" < n and (S,N) cannot be a perfect equilibrium of the game.
